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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
ROBYN R. PEARSON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 980112-CA 
Priority No. 2 
(Not incarcerated) 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this appeal 
from two misdemeanor convictions entered in a court of record. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW. STANDARDS OF REVIEW. 
AND PRESERVATION OF ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for failure to disclose 
transaction to government employer? 
In reviewing this issue, the Court will need to determine after Mr. Pearson marshals 
the evidence whether the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, are sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds would necessarily harbor a reasonable doubt as to Pearson's guilt. See e.g. 
State v. Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87-88 (Utah 1993)(discussing standard of appellate review for 
insufficiency claims); State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah App. 1996)(discussing 
marshaling requirement). 
This issue was properly preserved when Pearson moved for dismissal at the close of 
the State's case (R. 617 at 76-77), and when Pearson moved in the alternative to arrest 
judgment or for a new trial after the conviction (R. 551-561; 563-579; 592-602). 
2. Does the trial court's failure to correctly instruct the jury on the mens rea of 
failure to disclose transaction to government employer require a new trial? 
The Court will review this question of law without deference, for correctness. See 
e.g. State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 354 (Utah App.)(elements instructions are reviewed for 
correctness), cert denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). 
This issue was properly preserved when Pearson requested proper jury instructions 
(R. 436,437,439-440,441-442,444), objected to the instructions given by the court (R. 116-
117), and moved in the alternative to arrest judgment or for a new trial after the conviction 
(R. 551-561; 563-579; 592-602). 
3. Was the evidence insufficient to sustain the conviction for theft of services? 
In reviewing this issue, the Court will need to determine after Mr. Pearson marshals 
the evidence whether the evidence and inferences to be drawn therefrom, when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the verdict, are sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds would necessarily harbor a reasonable doubt as to Pearson's guilt. See e.g. 
e.g. State v.Wood. 868 P.2d 70, 87-88 (Utah 1993)(discussing standard of appellate review 
for insufficiency claims); State v. Farrow. 919 P.2d 50, 53 (Utah App. 1996)(discussing 
marshaling requirement). 
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This issue was properly preserved when Pearson moved for dismissal at the close of 
the State's case (R. 617 at 76-77), and when Pearson moved in the alternative to arrest 
judgment or for a new trial after the conviction (R. 551-561; 563-579; 592-602). 
CONTROLLING STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes pertain, and are reproduced in the addendum to this brief: 
Constitution of Utah, Article I §7 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV 
Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-5 
Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-10 
Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-304 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. AND DISPOSITION 
The State charged Mr. Pearson with one count of abuse of his official position, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4,l with one count of failure 
1
 Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4 provided at the time of this prosecution, 
A public officer, public employee, or legislator may not: 
(1) accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity 
that he might reasonably expect would require or induce him to improperly 
disclose controlled information that he has gained by reason of his official 
position; 
(2) disclose or improperly use controlled, private, or protected information 
acquired by reason of his official position or in the course of official duties in 
order to further substantially the officer's or employee's personal economic 
interest or to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others; 
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to: 
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to disclose a transaction to his government employer, a class A misdemeanor, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-5,2 and with one count of theft of services, a class B 
(a) further substantially the officer's or employee's 
personal economic interest; or 
(b) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or 
others; 
(4) accept other employment that he might expect would impair his 
independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties; or 
(5) accept other employment that he might expect would interfere with the 
ethical performance of his public duties. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 17-16a-5 provides, 
(1) No elected or appointed officer may receive or agree to receive 
compensation for assisting any person or business entity in any transaction 
involving the county in which he is an officer unless he files with the county 
legislative body a sworn statement giving the information required by this 
section, and discloses in open meeting to the members of the body of which 
he is a member, immediately prior to the discussion, the information required 
by Subsection (3). 
(2) The statement required to be filed by this section shall be filed ten 
days prior to the date of any agreement between the elected or appointed 
officer and the person or business entity being assisted or ten days prior to the 
receipt of compensation by the business entity. The statement is public 
information and is available for examination by the public. 
(3) The statement and disclosure shall contain the following 
information: 
(a) the name and address of the officer; 
(b) the name and address of the person or business entity 
being or to be assisted, or in which the appointed or elected 
official has a substantial interest; and 
(c) a brief description of the transaction as to which service 
is rendered or is to be rendered and of the nature of the service 
performed or to be performed. 
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misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-4093 (R. 1-2). The State subsequently 
amended the information to change various details (R. 256-258, 275, 617 at 77-82). 
Mr. Pearson pled not guilty at his first appearance, and following the preliminary 
hearing, the magistrate ordered the case bound over as charged (R. 26-27; 72-79). Pearson 
pled not guilty at the district court arraignment (R. 91-92). 
Judge Ray M. Harding Sr. was later assigned to the case (R. 388-391; 409). 
Following the presentation of the State's case to the jury, Pearson moved to dismiss 
(R. 617 at 76-77). After taking this motion under advisement, the court later denied it (R. 
617 at 188). 
3
 Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409 provides, 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are 
available only for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means 
designed to avoid the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services 
of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his 
own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, 
professional service, public utility and transportation services, restaurant, 
hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the 
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, 
telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, 
sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or 
a form of deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the 
services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in 
Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9. 
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The jury acquitted Mr. Pearson of Count 1, and convicted him of Count 2 and 3 (R. 
502, 544-545). 
Pearson moved the trial court in the alternative to arrest judgment or to grant a new 
trial (R. 551-561; 563-579; 592-602). The State opposed the motion (R. 580-591). 
The trial court denied the motion, sentenced Pearson to eighteen months in jail, and 
fined Pearson $3,500 (R. 606-610). The court then placed Pearson on probation for two 
years (R. 606). 
The court signed and filed the judgment, sentence and commitment on January 21, 
1998 (R. 606,609). Defense counsel filed a timely notice of appeal on January 30,1998 (R. 
613-614). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Evidence Pertaining to Count I and Providing General Background 
Robyn Pearson was the Millard County Administrator for many years, and was 
appointed to do so by the county commissioners (e.g. R. 618 at 60-61). Among many other 
responsibilities, it was his duty, established by longstanding ordinance, to oversee county 
waste management ( e ^ R . 618 at 72,233,235; R. 617 at 12-15; State's Exhibit 47, Defense 
Exhibit 49). 
In 1990, the Utah Legislature passed Senate Bill 255, which contemplated the creation 
of a statewide solid waste management plan, to be devised after each county submitted to the 
state a twenty year plan for each county (R. 618 at 48,74, State's Exhibit 1). Senate Bill 255 
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was funded in 1991 with $400,000, and the state granted each county a portion of that 
amount on the basis of a formula, in order to facilitate each county's completion of a twenty 
year solid waste plan (R. 618 at 74, 82). 
The state promulgated mandatory rules and helpful guidelines to assist the counties 
in completing their plans, and permitted the counties to choose whether to complete their 
plans with their own staff, or to hire outside consultants to complete their plans (R. 618 at 
55, 66, 84). 
County commissioners were ultimately responsible to insure compliance with Senate 
Bill 255, and for the creation, approval and submission of each county's twenty year plan 
(e.g. R. 618 at 65-66, 90, 104-105, State's Exhibit 1 at 3, State's Exhibit 2 at v, State's 
Exhibit 3 at ii, v). 
Millard County hired Joe Urbanik and his firm, Stansbury Consulting, to assist in the 
completion of the Millard County plan (R. 618 at 69). Urbanik and his firm served several 
Utah counties, in consulting with them on their twenty year plan (R. 618 at 69,108; State's 
Exhibit 10). 
Millard County was allotted slightly less than $12,000 from the state in order to 
complete its twenty year plan, and Urbanik was unwilling to do all of the work required to 
complete the Millard County plan for that amount of money (R. 618 at 98, 102, 142). 
In Urbanik's words, he "browbeat" Pearson into subcontracting with him, so that 
Pearson would be responsible for holding local public meetings, conducting local surveys, 
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and gathering necessary information (R. 618 at 142). Urbanik received most of the money 
allotted by the State, and Pearson received half of the money paid to Urbanik in exchange 
for his services (R. 618 at 168-174). 
Under Urbanik's contract with the county, State's Exhibit 18, Urbanik was to provide 
the plan to comply with Senate Bill 255, and the county was to provide a substantial amount 
of local data and some forms, upon which he was entitled to rely in formulating the plan (R. 
618 at 129-130, 188, 204-210). The state guidelines were incorporated into the contract 
between Urbanik and the county, and the guidelines required the local jurat to provide the 
relevant information (R. 618 at 130). The county remained fundamentally responsible for 
the plan, and Stansbury was hired as a consultant (R. 618 at 212). 
Pearson and Urbanik informed the county commissioners of their subcontracting 
arrangement, and the Commissioners approved of it, provided that Pearson completed his 
tasks on his own time (R. 618 at 124,155, 179-183,199,221-222,232-233,241,243,254, 
273-74, 283; State's Exhibit 41 at page 2, State's Exhibit 42). 
Pearson did not work any set hours for the county, but was expected to fulfill all tasks 
assigned by the commissioners (R. 618 at 236-238). Pearson completed his work on the 
subcontract, and also fulfilled all of his other duties as the Millard County Administrator (R. 
618 at 238). 
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The county attorney also approved of the subcontracting arrangement, provided that 
Urbanik and Stansbury maintain control and that Pearson did his work on his own time (R. 
618 at 183-186, 282). 
Keith Burnett, program manager at the State Division of Community Development, 
discussed the propriety of Pearson's subcontracting with Urbanik, and informed Pearson that 
there would be no problem if the county plan met the State specifications (R. 618 at 105-06, 
111). They did not discuss laws pertaining to ethics or disclosure requirements (R. 618 at 
114). 
Evidence Bearing on Count II 
Pearson never filed a form with the county clerk officially disclosing his 
subcontracting work with Urbanik and Stansbury (R. 617 at 11). 
No one filed such forms in Millard County, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-l 
et seg., until the date of the offense charged against Pearson, when Millard County Clerk 
Marlene Whicker first heard of the disclosure statements when she went to a workshop in 
1993, and informed the county attorney of the need to file them (R. 617 at 10,16-17, 85-88). 
Once she informed the county attorney of the law, he drafted some forms and handed them 
out (R. 617 at 16-17, Defendant's Exhibit 61 at page 2). The forms he drafted, however, 
applied only to those doing business directly with the county, and did not cover Pearson's 
circumstances as a subcontractor with one doing business with the county (R. 617 at 91). 
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The form he drafted did not inform county employees in Pearson's circumstances of the need 
to file a disclosure form (R. 617 at 110). 
There was no evidence presented that Pearson was aware of his duty to formally 
disclose the arrangement with Stansbury. 
Evidence Bearing on Count HI 
In the course of working on the county plan, Pearson called Urbanik long distance 
from his county office (e.g. R. 618 at 150, State's Exhibit 21), required private companies 
to weigh their trash to obtain data for the plan and told them to bill the county for the 
weighing (R. 618 at 295-96, State's Exhibit 96), used county letterhead and postage funds 
in announcing public meetings and in requesting local companies to comply with the data 
collection (R. 617 at 53-55, State's Exhibit 55), and had county secretaries type and fax 
letters on county letterhead, equipment and time in facilitation of the completion of the plan 
(R. 617 at 37-59, 61-65, Defendant's Exhibit 56, State's Exhibits 35 and 36). For this, he 
was charged with theft of services valued at less than $300 (R. 608). 
Under Senate Bill 255, the county was ultimately responsible to provide a twenty year 
plan, and the contract between the county and Urbanik left the county responsible for the 
ultimate creation of the plan and for the provision of the relevant data to Urbanik - the 
contract incorporated the state guidelines for the plan, which required the local authority to 
provide the relevant underlying information for the formulation of the plan (R. (R. 618 at 
129-130, 188, 204-210,212). Pearson was obligated to oversee county waste management 
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as part of his job as Millard County Administrator well before and after the passage of Senate 
Bill 255 (e.g. State's Exhibit 47). 
The county commissioners and county attorney authorized Pearson's receipt of the 
funds for the subcontract with Urbanik, with only two conditions: that Urbanik maintain 
control, and that Pearson do the work on his own time; there was no condition that Pearson 
use no county resources in completing the plan (R. 618 at 124,155,179-186,199,221-222, 
232-233, 241, 243, 254, 273-74, 282-83; State's Exhibit 41 at page 2, State's Exhibit 42). 
The county commissioners had complete control over county expenditures (R. 618 at 
246), and the State's evidence was contradictory regarding whether or not the commissioners 
believed Pearson's aforementioned use of county equipment and services by Pearson. 
County Commissioner Frank Baker testified that he did not know exactly what the 
county would be obligated to contribute to the completion of the county's plan, but believed 
that Pearson was authorized to use the county's long distance telephone, fax and secretarial 
services in completing the plan, and indicated that he expected the county to incur these costs 
under the arrangement with Urbanik (R. 618 at 244-245, 259-260). 
County Commissioner Lana Moon was of the opinion that Pearson's expenses should 
have been paid for by the money he received under the subcontract (R. 618 at 288-292). 
There was no evidence that Pearson knew he was unauthorized to use county 
equipment and services in completing the plan. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The mens rea element of failure to disclose transaction to a government employer 
required the State to prove that Pearson intentionally and knowingly failed to file the 
appropriate disclosure form and intentionally and knowingly failed to make the appropriate 
disclosure at a public meeting. Thus, at a minimum, to sustain the conviction on count 2, the 
State was obligated to prove that it was Pearson's "conscious objective" to fail to make the 
appropriate disclosures. 
The government presented no evidence that Pearson had the conscious objective to 
fail to disclose any transaction, or that he even knew of his duties to disclose, and the 
prosecutor argued that he had no duty to present such proof. 
Because the evidence was insufficient, the Court should order the conviction reversed 
and the charge dismissed. 
The trial court never clearly instructed the jury on the mens rea element of failure to 
disclose a transaction and refused to give the jurors Pearson's requested jury instructions 
articulating his defense on the mens rea element of this offense. This compromised Pearson's 
rights to a fair trial. Thus, at a minimum, there must be a new trial on count 2. 
In order to obtain a conviction for theft of services, the government should have 
proved Pearson's knowing, unauthorized use of county services and equipment in his 
employment. 
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There was no evidence presented that Pearson knew he was unauthorized to use the 
services and equipment at issue. In fact, the evidence indicated that Pearson was in fact 
authorized to use the services and equipment. 
Because the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction for count 3, this Court 
should order the conviction reversed and the charge dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN THE CONVICTION FOR 
FAILURE TO DISCLOSE A TRANSACTION TO A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER. 
A. IT WAS THE GOVERNMENT'S BURDEN TO PROVE THAT FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE A TRANSACTION TO HIS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER WAS 
PEARSON'S CONSCIOUS OBJECTIVE. 
It is axiomatic that the prosecution must prove mens rea for each element of any 
offense charged, unless the offense is clearly defined by statute as a strict liability offense. 
See e.g. State v. Elton. 680 P.2d 727, 728-29 (Utah 1984); Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102. 
In the instant case, the mens rea element of Count II, failure to disclose transaction 
to a government employer, required the State to prove that Pearson intentionally and 
knowingly failed to file the appropriate disclosure form and make the appropriate disclosure 
at a public meeting. Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-5 defines the offense as follows: 
(1) No elected or appointed officer may receive or agree to receive 
compensation for assisting any person or business entity in any transaction 
involving the county in which he is an officer unless he files with the county 
legislative body a sworn statement giving the information required by this 
section, and discloses in open meeting to the members of the body of which 
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he is a member, immediately prior to the discussion, the information required 
by Subsection (3). 
(2) The statement required to be filed by this section shall be filed ten 
days prior to the date of any agreement between the elected or appointed 
officer and the person or business entity being assisted or ten days prior to the 
receipt of compensation by the business entity. The statement is public 
information and is available for examination by the public. 
(3) The statement and disclosure shall contain the following 
information: 
(a) the name and address of the officer; 
(b) the name and address of the person or business entity 
being or to be assisted, or in which the appointed or elected 
official has a substantial interest; and 
(c) a brief description of the transaction as to which service 
is rendered or is to be rendered and of the nature of the service 
performed or to be performed. 
The mens rea element of the offense is provided by Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-10, which 
provides, 
In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law, any 
person who knowingly and intentionally violates this part is guilty of a class 
A misdemeanor and shall be dismissed from employment or removed from 
office. 
At a minimum, the State was obligated to prove that it was Pearson's "conscious 
objective" to fail to make the appropriate disclosures. See e,g. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 
(l)(indicating that someone behaves "[i]ntentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect 
to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result."). 
The legislature acted appropriately in selecting this high level of mens rea for the 
State to prove in order to impose criminal, as opposed to civil, responsibility for failure to 
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disclose. The criminal law generally does not impose criminal liability for failure to act, 
absent proof that the actor was aware of his duty. See generally LaFave, Criminal Law, 
§3.3(b), at 207 (2nd Edition, 1986)("Though one might otherwise be under a duty to act, so 
that omission to do so would ordinarily render him criminally liable, the prevailing view is 
that he may not be held liable if he does not know the facts indicating a duty to act."); id. at 
208 (legislature may not impose criminal liability for failure to act in the absence of 
knowledge of duty to act and knowledge of scope of that duty, citing Lambert v. California, 
355 U.S. 225 (1957)(interpreting right to due process of law as requiring defense of lack of 
knowledge of duty)). See also Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law. Ch. 6, §4 at 667-668 (3rd 
Edition, 1982)("In general one 'cannot be said in any manner to neglect or refuse to perform 
a duty unless he has knowledge of the condition of things which requires performance at his 
hands."). 
In imposing the high intentional mens rea element for a crime involving misconduct 
in public office, the Utah legislature was also acting in conformity with the historical practice 
of requiring proof of corrupt intent to establish a crime stemming from non-feasance in 
office. See generally Perkins and Boyce, Criminal Law. Chapter 5, §3 at 540-42 and 545-
548 (3rd Edition, 1982). 
B. THE GOVERNMENT FAILED TO MEET ITS BURDEN. 
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There is no evidence to marshal even implying that Pearson had the conscious 
objective to fail to disclose any transaction, or that he even knew of his technical duties to 
disclose. 
The evidence demonstrated that no one filed disclosure forms in Millard County, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 17-16a-1 et seq., until well after the date of the offense charged 
against Pearson (June of 1992 (R. 609)), when Millard County Clerk Marlene Whicker first 
heard of the disclosure statements when she went to a workshop in 1993, and informed the 
county attorney of the need to file them (R. 617 at 10,16-17, 85-88). Once she informed the 
county attorney of the law, he drafted some forms and handed them out (R. 617 at 16-17, 
Defendant's Exhibit 61 at page 2). The County Attorney testified that he, himself, advisor 
to the other county employees,4 was unaware of the disclosure duties until 1993, when Ms. 
Whicker learned of the disclosure requirements, and he began distributing disclosure forms 
(R. 110-111). 
The absence of any evidence to marshal to establish the appropriate mens rea is 
confirmed by the State's argument in the trial court that the State had no obligation to prove 
that Pearson was aware of and consciously chose to neglect his technical disclosure duties 
(R. 587). 
Because there was no evidence that Pearson had the requisite mens rea, this Court 
should order dismissed the conviction for failure to disclose. 
4
 See e ^ Utah Code Ann. §17-18-1 (discussing duties of county attorneys). 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO CORRECTLY INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE 
MENS REA ELEMENT OF FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TRANSACTION TO A 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER. 
It is elementary that a jury must be instructed properly as to each element of an 
offense. See e.g. State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33, 35 (Utah 1980). Further, a defendant's right 
to a fair trial hinges on his right to have the jury instructed in a clear and understandable 
manner on his theory of the case. See e ^ State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981). 
Prior to trial, counsel for Mr. Pearson requested five jury instructions explaining the 
mens rea of the offense of failure to disclose, and embodying Pearson's defense to Count II, 
that the State could not establish the mens rea element of the offense and that Pearson had 
no knowledge of the statutory disclosure duties imposed by Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-5.5 
5
 Copies of the requested instructions and the instructions given are in the 
addendum to this brief. 
Requested instruction number 14 read, 
A person engages in conduct: 
1. intentionally or with intent with respect to the nature of his conduct 
or to a result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
2. Knowingly or with knowledge with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. 
(R. 444). 
Requested instruction number 15 read, 
You will note that in connection with these charges, the defendant 
Robyn Pearson must have acted intentionally and knowingly before his 
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conduct is criminal. That is referred to as the "culpable mental state" of the 
crime. It is often said that in order to commit a crime a person must act with 
criminal intent or there must be a mental component to the crime. 
You have heard evidence that the Millard County Commission may 
have approved of and/or authorized Mr. Pearson to subcontract with Stansbury 
Design, Inc. Should you find that Robyn Pearson received approval from the 
County Commission for such employment, and reasonably relied upon that 
approval, then he would not possess the requisite culpable mental state, that is 
to say, he would not act intentionally and knowingly to violate the law, and 
therefore, would not have acted with the culpable mental state for the 
commission of the crime. Under such circumstances, he should not be 
convicted of such crime. 
If you find that Robyn Pearson engaged in the conduct which is 
prohibited by law, but did not do so intentionally and knowingly, then he is 
entitled to be found not guilty of that crime. 
(R. 443). 
Requested instruction number 16 read, 
To establish the commission of the crime of failure to disclose 
transaction to government employer, the State must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt certain essential facts which the laws of the State define as 
being necessary elements constituting the crime of failure to disclose 
transaction to government employer, as charged in count 2. Proof of the 
commission of the crime of failure to disclose transaction to government 
employment requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each and every 
one of the following essential facts: 
1. The defendant, Robyn Pearson, was the appointed Millard County 
Administrator during June of 1992; 
2. During June of 1992, the defendant, Robyn Pearson, did agree to 
receive compensation for assisting Stansbury Design, Inc.; 
3. In a transaction with Millard County; 
4. The defendant, Robyn Pearson, did so without filing a sworn 
statement setting forth certain information required by Utah law 10 days in 
advance of his agreement to receive compensation from Stansbury Design, 
Inc., by affidavit and in open meetings with the County Commission; 
5. The information required to be disclosed is the name and address 
of the officer; the name and address of the business entity doing business 
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with the county and a brief description of the transaction he is involved 
with; 
6. The defendant, Robyn Pearson, failed to disclose this information 
knowingly and intentionally. 
Therefore, if you find by the evidence received during the trial that 
the State has failed to prove any one of these essential elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to find the defendant not guilty of 
failure to disclose transaction to government employer. On the other hand, 
should you find that the State has proved each and every one of the essential 
elements above beyond a reasonable doubt, it will be your duty to find the 
defendant guilty of failure to disclose transaction to government employer. 
(R. 441-442). 
Requested instruction number 17 read, 
The Millard County Attorney is charged, by law, with the duty to 
advise County officers on matters relating to the duties of their respective 
offices. 
As you will note from the elements instruction involving count 2, 
Robyn Pearson, as the County Administrator, had a duty to disclose certain 
information required by Utah law. 
When, as here, an affirmative duty is created on the part of a public 
employee, you must find that the public employee had actual knowledge of 
that duty, and intentionally and knowingly disregarded that known duty. 
Obviously, he must know of that duty prior tot the time he is required to act. 
The Millard County Attorney is charged with the duty of advising 
County employees of their public duty, which includes the duty to disclose 
information in a timely fashion. Your are instructed that the recipients of 
that advice are entitled to rely upon that advice, and in the event that the 
advice given by the County Attorney is inadequate or does not cover the 
particular duty involved in this case, that is, the duty to disclose information 
by affidavit and in open meeting with the County Commission, the fact that 
he is involved in a transaction with another entity and assisting that entity in 
receiving compensation from Millard County, then that fact may be 
considered by you in determining whether or not Robyn Pearson acted 
knowingly and intentionally. 
You will note from the elements instruction involving count 2, that 
this duty to disclose is to be performed ten days prior to Mr. Pearson's 
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agreement to assist Stansbury in the transaction involving Millard County, 
for compensation. Therefore, the advice required to be given by the County 
Attorney must have been given prior to Mr. Pearson's duty in order for that 
to be effective advice. The advice must also specifically inform Mr. 
Pearson of his duty to disclose information for assisting another in a 
transaction with Millard County, as opposed to any other duty. 
As with all elements, the State bears the burden of proving the truth 
of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. This includes the element 
that Mr. Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in violating his duty to 
disclose. 
This means that should you have a reasonable doubt as to either of 
the following circumstances, then you are required to find the defendant 
Robyn Pearson not guilty. Those two circumstances are: 1) that the County 
Attorney advised Robyn Pearson of his duty prior to the time Robyn 
Pearson was required to act on that duty; and/or 2) that the County Attorney 
properly advised Robyn Pearson of the nature of the duty as it relates to 
assisting another entity with a transaction with Millard County for 
compensation as opposed to any other duty Mr. Pearson may have had 
pursuant to Utah law. 
Should you have the reasonable doubt as to the truth of either of 
those circumstances, you are instructed to find the defendant Robyn 
Pearson not guilty of count 2 of the Information. 
(R. 439-440). 
Requested instruction number 18 read, 
As regarding count 2, there has been evidence offered that the 
County Attorney gave advice to the County officers, including the 
defendant, regarding their duty to disclose information. You are instructed 
that the recipients of that advice are entitled to rely upon the advice given, 
and in the event the advice is inadequate, that inadequacy may be 
considered by you, the jury, in deciding weather or not Mr. Pearson acted 
intentionally and knowingly as is required by law, in failing to disclose 
information to the County Commission. 
That is to say that if Robyn Pearson were given advice that did not 
properly advise him of his duty to disclose information, or was otherwise 
inadequate regarding this duty, this fact may be considered by you in 
deciding if Robyn Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally, if he did not 
20 
While the trial court generally instructed the jury on intentional and knowing mental 
states,6 and mentioned the mens rea in the instruction addressing the role of the county 
act knowingly and intentionally, the he is not guilty of count 2. 
(R. 436). 
Requested instruction number 19 read, 
You will note from the elements instruction, as it related to count 2 
of the Information, that the defendant's conduct in connection with this 
county must be knowingly and intentionally committed. This means that 
the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to your satisfaction, 
that the defendant had actual knowledge of his duty to disclose information, 
and acting with that actual knowledge, intentionally elected not to disclose 
that information to the County Commission. 
Should you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the 
defendant Robyn Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in connection 
with his failure to disclose, then he is entitled to be found not guilty of this 
crime. 
On the other hand, should you find that the defendant acted 
knowingly and intentionally, then you would be entitled to find the 
defendant guilty of that crime. 
(R. 437). 
6
 Instruction number 14 re^d, 
A person engages in conduct intentionally with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
Instruction No. 15 read, 
A person engages in conduct knowingly with respect to his conduct or 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly with respect 
to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
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attorney in advising county employees,7 the elements instruction given by the trial court did 
not instruct the jury on the State's burden of proving the element that Pearson acted 
knowingly and intentionally in failing to make the required disclosures. The elements 
instruction actually given by the trial court on count 2 read as follows: 
To convict the defendant on Count II, Failure to Disclose Transaction 
to Government Employer, you must believe from all of the evidence and 
beyond a reasonable doubt each of the following elements: 
(1) That the defendant, Robyn R. Pearson, the appointed Millard 
County Administrator, 
(2) In Millard County, state of Utah 
(3) on or about June 1992, 
(4) did knowingly and intentionally receive or agree to receive 
compensation for assisting Joe Urbanik, dba Stansbury Design Associates, in 
a transaction, to wit: preparation of a solid waste management plan involving 
Millard County, 
(5) without filing a sworn statement giving the information required by 
Utah Code Annotated §17-16a-5(2-3), and without disclosing the same to the 
Millard County Commission in open meeting. 
(R. 527-528). 
7
 Instruction no. 17 read, 
You are instructed that county officials are entitled to rely upon the 
advise of the Millard County Attorney when the County Attorney acts in his 
official position and in the event the advice is inadequate, that inadequacy may 
be considered by you, the jury, in deciding whether or not Mr. Pearson acted 
knowingly and intentionally as is required by law, in failing to disclose 
information to the County Commission. 
That is to say that if Robyn R. Pearson were given advice that did not 
properly advise him of his duty to disclose information, or was otherwise 
inadequate regarding this duty, this fact may be considered by you in deciding 
if Robyn R. Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally. If he did not act 
knowingly and intentionally, then he is not guilty of Count II. 
(R. 525). 
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If you find from all the evidence that each and every element of Failure 
to Disclose Transaction to Government Employer, as explained in this 
instruction has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the 
defendant guilty. However, if you find that one or more of the above elements 
have not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. 
(R. 535). 
In accordance with the instruction given, the jury may well have believed (and given 
the complete absence of evidence of Pearson's awareness of disclosure duties, must have 
believed) that a conviction could enter for Count II on the basis of Pearson's strict liability 
for failure to file a sworn statement and disclose to the commission, regardless of his 
complete lack of awareness of a duty to file and disclose. 
In the trial court, the State argued that Instruction 7 correctly required the jury to find 
a knowing and intentional mental state in failing to file a sworn statement and in failing to 
make a disclosure to the commission in an open meeting, because the Court used small case 
letters at the outset of each element and commas in between the elements, thus indicating to 
the jury that the intentional and knowing mental state mentioned in paragraph 4, in reference 
to knowing and intentional receipt of compensation, also applied to the elements relating to 
non-disclosure (R. 588-589). 
The court's use of small case letters at the outset of each element and commas in 
between the elements did not somehow merge elements 4 and 5, but merely corrected the 
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technical errors in the punctuation and capitalization provided in the State's requested 
instruction.8 
Jury instruction #7, as given to the jury, listed five separate elements, and by its own 
terms required the jury to find each element individually and beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to convict. While element number 4 certainly required the jury to find a knowing or 
intentional mental state in the receipt or agreement to receive compensation, element number 
5 did not specify any mens rea with regard to the failure to file a sworn statement and 
disclose to the commission. Cf. State v. Jones. 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987)(failure of 
elements instruction to include in the first aggravating circumstance listed in the instruction 
The State's instruction read, 
You are hereby instructed that the elements of FAILURE TO 
DISCLOSE TRANSACTION TO HIS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, as charged in this case as Count #2 of the Information 
are as follows: 
1. That the Defendant, ROBYN R. PEARSON, the appointed Millard 
County Administrator; 
2. In Millard County, State of Utah; 
3. On or about June 1992 
4. Did knowingly and intentionally receive or agree to receive 
compensation for assisting Joe Urbanik, dba Stansbury Designs, in a 
transaction, to wit; preparation of a solid waste management plan involving 
Millard County. 
5. Without filing a sworn statement giving the information required by 
U.C.A. §17-16a-5(2)&(3) and disclose the same to the Millard County 
Commission in open meeting. 
If you find that any one or all of the above elements have not been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant "not guilty." 
If you find that all of the above elements have been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant guilty of a Class "A" 
Misdemeanor of Failure to Disclose Transaction to His Government Employer. 
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the mens rea element was error); State v. Stringham. 957 P.2d 602, 609 (Utah App. 
1998)(jury was not expected to have divined missing mens rea element from elements 
instruction which did not explicitly state the mens rea, or from other instructions). 
In the trial court, the government never disputed Pearson's argument that there was 
no proof that he was aware of a duty to file a sworn statement, or to disclose to the 
commission. Rather, the government argued that requested instruction 19 was an incorrect 
statement of the law,9 because the government was not required to prove that Pearson had 
actual knowledge of his duty to disclose and intentionally elected not to fulfill the duty (R. 
587). 
The State's argument that it was not required to prove Pearson's knowledge and 
conscious abnegation of his duty was inconsistent with the State's other contention that the 
jury was properly instructed in Instruction 7 that it was required to find that Pearson acted 
knowingly and intentionally in failing to disclose the information (R. 589). The argument 
9
 Requested instruction 19 provided, 
You will note from the elements instruction, as it related to count 2 of 
the Information, that the defendant's conduct in connection with this count 
must be knowingly and intentionally committed. This means that the State 
must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, and to your satisfaction, that the 
defendant had actual knowledge of his duty to disclose information, and acting 
with that actual knowledge, intentionally elected not to disclose that 
information to the County Commission. 
Should you have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant 
Robyn Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally in connection with his 
failure to disclose, then he is entitled to be found not guilty of this crime. 
On the other hand, should you find that the defendant acted knowingly 
and intentionally, then you would be entitled to find the defendant guilty of 
that crime. 
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was also legally incorrect. See Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-5 (requiring disclosure); §17-16a-
10 (classifying knowing and intentional failure to comply with 17-16a-5 as a class A 
misdemeanor). 
The State argued in the trial court that the court should not have given requested 
instruction 19, because mistake of law is not a defense on the facts of this case (R. 586-
587).10 
Mr. Pearson did not raise mistake of law as a defense in this case, but merely argued 
in his defense that the government failed in its burden to establish affirmatively and beyond 
10
 Utah Code Ann. §76-2-304 defines the defense of mistake of law, stating, 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which 
disproves the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that 
crime. (2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning 
of a penal law is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably 
believed his conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's 
reasonable reliance upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law 
contained in a written order or grant of permission 
by an administrative agency charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question; 
or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law 
contained in an opinion of a court of record or 
made by a public servant charged by law with 
responsibility for interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may 
constitute a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted 
of a lesser included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were 
as he believed. 
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a reasonable doubt that Pearson was aware of and knowingly and intentionally failed to fulfill 
his duties to file a sworn statement and disclose to the commission. 
In the trial court, in support of its argument that Pearson was not entitled to his 
requested instruction 19 because he had no legitimate defense that he was unaware of his 
disclosure duties, the State relied on State v. Larsen. 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993) and State 
v. Harry. 873 P.2d 1149 (Utah App. 1994)(R. 584-586). 
In Larsen, the court was interpreting the securities fraud statutes, Utah Code Ann. 
§ § 61 -1 -2(2) and 61-1-21. Because the latter statute required proof of willful action in order 
to establish a criminal offense, the court noted that the government was required to establish 
that the defendant acted willfully in omitting or misstating material facts under 61-1-2(2) in 
order to obtain a conviction. 865 P.2d at 1357. The court rejected Mr. Larsen's arguments 
that the court should interpret the term "willfully" as requiring proof of an intent to 
manipulate, deceive or defraud, finding that this definition was inconsistent with Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-103, which defines the willful mental state in other terms. 865 P.2d at 1358. The 
court also rejected the defendant's argument that the court should require proof of a scienter 
element, finding that the legislature's choice not to specify such an element was within its 
prerogative. Id. at 1358-1360. 
Harry likewise involved the securities fraud statutes, and the defendant raised the 
same arguments rejected in Larsen. Harry, 873 P.2d 1149,1153. This Court found Larsen 
controlling and rejected Mr. Harry's contentions. Id. 
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Larsen and Harry are inapposite to the instant case, because Pearson never asked the 
court to redefine the levels of mens rea defined by §76-2-103, and never asked the court to 
require proof of scienter, or intent to manipulate, defraud or deceive, or any other non-
legislated element of the offense at issue. Pearson has simply maintained that the jury should 
have been instructed in accordance with § §76-1 -203 and 17-16a-10, that the government was 
required to prove that Pearson acted knowingly and intentionally with regard to each element 
of the offense charged. 
Even if other instructions given by the court correctly intimated the mens rea for the 
offense charged,11 the absence of a correct elements instruction is nonetheless reversible 
error. E.g. State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980). Moreover, the absence of instructions 
clearly addressing mens rea and Pearson's theory of the case that he lacked the requisite 
mental state constitutes reversible error. E.g. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 
11
 It is noteworthy that the information instruction given to the jury did not 
indicate that there was any requisite mental state to sustain a conviction for count II. 
Instruction number 3 read, 
This is a criminal action brought by the State of Utah against the 
defendant in which the defendant is accused by the Information of the 
commission of the crimes of: 
COUNT II: FAILURE TO DISCLOSE TRANSACTION TO 
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYER, in that the defendant, Robyn R. Pearson, the 
appointed Millard County Administrator, during June 1992, did agree to 
receive compensation for assisting any person or business entity involved in 
any transaction involving Millard County, to wit: Stansbury Design 
Associates, without filing a sworn statement giving the information required 
by Utah Code Annotated §17-16A-5(2-3), to Millard County Commissioners 
in open meeting in violation of Utah Code Annotated §17-16a-5, a class a 
misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code annotated §17-16a-10. 
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1981)(discussing right to clear statement of defense injury instructions, and demonstrating 
importance of clear instructions on mens red). 
The requested jury instructions were correct and clear statements of the law which 
properly would have informed the jurors of the government's burden to prove Pearson 
intentionally failed to disclose a transaction, and of his defense that he did not act with the 
requisite mental state.12 Thus, the instructions should have been given in order to insure Mr. 
Pearson's rights to a fair trial. See e^g. Potter. Laine. supra. 
As was discussed above, it was the State's affirmative duty to establish Pearson's 
intentional and knowing failure to comply with the disclosure duties, and the State presented 
no evidence on this point. This should result in reversal of the conviction and dismissal of 
the charge. At a minimum, because the jury was not clearly instructed on the mens rea 
element of Count II, and on Mr. Pearson's defense regarding that element, this Court should 
rule that Pearson's right to a fair trial was compromised, and should order a new trial. See 
e.g. Potter. Laine. supra. 
POINT III 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN 
THE CONVICTION FOR THEFT OF SERVICES. 
12
 The government argued in the trial court that Pearson's requested instruction 
16 was cumulative to the instruction given by the Court (R. 587). Pearson's requested 
instruction 16 was not cumulative to the instruction given, because, in the paragraph 
numbered 6, instruction 16 clearly informed the jury of its duty to find that Pearson acted 
knowingly and intentionally in failure to disclose the information. 
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The jury convicted Mr. Pearson of Count III of the information, theft of services, for 
unauthorized use of county services and equipment in his employment with Stansbury, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409(2).13 
By definition, the offense requiredproof of both that Pearson was not entitled and that 
Pearson knew he was not entitled to divert the services at issue. Id. 
The only evidence to marshal in support of the element that Pearson was not entitled 
to the services was the testimony of County Commissioner Lana Moon, who was of the 
13
 The statute defining theft of services, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409, provides in 
full, 
76-6-409. Theft of services 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are 
available only for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means 
designed to avoid the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services 
of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his 
own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, 
professional service, public utility and transportation services, restaurant, 
hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the 
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, 
telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, 
sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or 
a form of deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the 
services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in 
Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9. 
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opinion that Pearson's expenses should have been paid for by the money he received under 
the subcontract (R. 618 at 288-292). 
Her testimony was countered by County Commissioner Frank Baker, who testified 
that he did not know exactly what the county would be obligated to contribute to the 
completion of the county's plan, but believed that Pearson was authorized to use the county's 
long distance telephone, fax and secretarial services in completing the plan, and indicated 
that he expected the county to incur these costs under the arrangement with Urbanik (R. 618 
at 244-245, 259-260). 
Regardless of the beliefs of the county commissioners, Pearson was entitled to utilize 
the county resources by virtue of his position as the county administrator, who was required 
by ordinance to oversee waste management in Millard County before, during and after the 
creation of the county plan under Senate Bill 255 (e.g. State's Exhibit 47). Under Senate Bill 
255, the county was ultimately responsible to provide a twenty year plan, and the contract 
between the county and Urbanik left the county responsible for the ultimate creation of the 
plan and for the provision of the relevant data to Urbanik - the contract incorporated the state 
guidelines for the plan, which required the local authority to provide the relevant underlying 
information for the formulation of the plan (R. (R. 618 at 129-130, 188, 204-210, 212). 
The county commissioners and county attorney authorized Pearson's receipt of the 
funds for the subcontract with Urbanik, with only two conditions: that Urbanik maintain 
control, and that Pearson do the work on his own time; there was no condition that Pearson 
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use no county resources in completing the plan (R. 618 at 124, 155,179-186,199,221-222, 
232-233, 241, 243, 254, 273-74, 282-83; State's Exhibit 41 at page 2, State's Exhibit 42). 
Assuming arguendo that the testimony of Commissioner Moon could alone sustain 
the element of Pearson's disentitlement to the services, there was no evidence whatsoever 
that Pearson knew he was not entitled to use county equipment and services in completing 
the plan. In his discussions of the subcontract with the county attorney, the county 
commissioners, and state authorities, the only conditions placed on Pearson were to do the 
work on his own time (R. 618 at 124, 155, 179-183,199,221-222, 232-233, 241, 243, 254, 
273-74, 283; State's Exhibit 41 at page 2, State's Exhibit 42),14 to permit Urbanik and 
Stansbury to maintain control (R. 618 at 183-186, 282), and to insure that the county plan 
met state specifications (R. 618 at 105-06, 111). There was no evidence that anyone informed 
Pearson that he was not to use county resources, or that he was aware that he was not entitled 
to do so. 
As was discussed above, it appears that Pearson in fact was entitled to use the county 
resources, given his role as county administrator over solid waste management, and the 
county's enduring responsibility under Senate Bill 255 and the contract with Urbanik to 
14
 Further evidence clarified that Pearson did not work set hours for the county, 
but was expected to work long enough to complete all tasks assigned by the county 
commissioners (R. 618 at 236-238). There was no dispute that Pearson completed his work 
on the subcontract, and also fulfilled all of his other duties as the Millard County 
Administrator (R. 618 at 238). 
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garner necessary information and provide it to Urbanik for the completion of the plan (e.g. 
State's Exhibit 47, R. 618 at 129-130, 188, 204-210, 212). 
Because there was no evidence to establish that Pearson diverted services to his 
benefit, while knowing that he was not entitled to do so, this Court should order dismissed 
the count of the information charging him with theft of services. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should order both convictions reversed and both charges dismissed for 
insufficient evidence. At a minimum, the Court should grant Mr. Pearson a new trial, 
wherein the jury is properly instructed regarding the mens rea the government must prove 
in order to obtain a conviction for failure to disclose a transaction to a government employer. 
DATED this day of December 1998. 
KENNETH R. BROWN 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
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Constitution of Utah, Article I §7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1 
All persons born or naturalized int eh United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of lief, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Utah Code Ann. §17-16a-5 
(1) No elected or appointed officer may receive or agree to receive 
compensation for assisting any person or business entity in any transaction 
involving the county in which he is an officer unless he files with the county 
legislative body a sworn statement giving the information required by this 
section, and discloses in open meeting to the members of the body of which 
he is a member, immediately prior to the discussion, the information required 
by Subsection (3). 
(2) The statement required to be filed by this section shall be filed ten days 
prior to the date of any agreement between the elected or appointed officer and 
the person or business entity being assisted or ten days prior to the receipt of 
compensation by the business entity. The statement is public information and 
is available for examination by the public. 
(3) The statement and disclosure shall contain the following information: 
(a) the name and address of the officer; 
(b) the name and address of the person or business entity being or to be 
assisted, or in which the appointed or elected official has a substantial interest; 
and 
(c) a brief description of the transaction as to which service is rendered or 
is to be rendered and of the nature of the service performed or to be performed. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17-16a-5, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 46, § 6; 1993, ch. 227, § 119. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, 
substituted "county legislative body" for "county commission" in Subsection (1). 
35 
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16a-10 
In addition to any penalty contained in any other provision of law, any person 
who knowingly and intentionally violates this part is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor and shall be dismissed from employment or removed from 
office. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 17-16a-10, enacted by L. 1983, ch. 46, § 6; 1991, ch. 241, §10. 
Utah Code Ann. §67-16-4 
It is an offense for a public officer, public employee, or legislator, under 
circumstances not amounting to a violation of Section 63-56-72 or 76-8-105, 
to: 
(1) accept employment or engage in any business or professional activity 
that he might reasonably expect would require or induce him to improperly 
disclose controlled information that he has gained by reason of his official 
position; 
(2) disclose or improperly use controlled, private, or protected information 
acquired by reason of his official position or in the course of official duties in 
order to further substantially the officer's or employee's personal economic 
interest or to secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others; 
(3) use or attempt to use his official position to: 
(a) further substantially the officer's or employee's personal 
economic interest; or 
(b) secure special privileges or exemptions for himself or others; 
(4) accept other employment that he might expect would impair his 
independence of judgment in the performance of his public duties; or 
(5) accept other employment that he might expect would interfere with the 
ethical performance of his public duties. 
HISTORY: L. 1969, ch. 128, § 4; 1989, ch. 147, § 14; 1991, ch. 259, § 69; 1992, ch. 280, § 
60; 1997, ch. 188, § 2; 1998, ch. 92, § 5. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1997 amendment, effective May 5,1997, added "or 
legislator" in the introductory language; substituted "or in the course...himself or others" for 
"nor use such information for his or another's private gain or benefit" in Subsection (2); 
added Subsection (3)(a); and made stylistic changes. 
The 1998 amendment, effective May 4,1998, in the introductory paragraph added "it is an 
offense for" at the beginning and substituted the language beginning "under circumstances" 
for "may not" at the end. 
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Utah Code Ann. §76-2-102 
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental 
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental 
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or 
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall 
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a 
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the 
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable 
mental state. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, § 
2. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-2-103 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or 
desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his 
conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his 
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surrounding 
his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or 
the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its 
disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that an 
ordinary person would exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the 
actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he 
ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that 
the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the circumstances as viewed from 
the actor's standpoint. 
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HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-103, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-2-304 
(1) Unless otherwise provided, ignorance or mistake of fact which disproves 
the culpable mental state is a defense to any prosecution for that crime. 
(2) Ignorance or mistake concerning the existence or meaning of a penal law 
is no defense to a crime unless: 
(a) Due to his ignorance or mistake, the actor reasonably believed his 
conduct did not constitute an offense, and 
(b) His ignorance or mistake resulted from the actor's reasonable reliance 
upon: 
(i) An official statement of the law contained in a written order or grant 
of permission by an administrative agency charged by law with responsibility 
for interpreting the law in question; or 
(ii) A written interpretation of the law contained in an opinion of a court 
of record or made by a public servant charged by law with responsibility for 
interpreting the law in question. 
(3) Although an actor's ignorance or mistake of fact or law may constitute 
a defense to the offense charged, he may nevertheless be convicted of a lesser 
included offense of which he would be guilty if the fact or law were as he 
believed. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-2-304, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-304; 1974, ch. 32, § 
5. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-409 
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains services which he knows are 
available only for compensation by deception, threat, force, or any other means 
designed to avoid the due payment for them. 
(2) A person commits theft if, having control over the disposition of services 
of another, to which he knows he is not entitled, he diverts the services to his 
own benefit or to the benefit of another who he knows is not entitled to them. 
(3) In this section "services" includes, but is not limited to, labor, 
professional service, public utility and transportation services, restaurant, 
hotel, motel, tourist cabin, rooming house, and like accommodations, the 
supplying of equipment, tools, vehicles, or trailers for temporary use, 
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telephone or telegraph service, steam, admission to entertainment, exhibitions, 
sporting events, or other events for which a charge is made. 
(4) Under this section "services" includes gas, electricity, water, sewer, or 
cable television services, only if the services are obtained by threat, force, or 
a form of deception not described in Section 76-6-409.3. 
(5) Under this section "services" includes telephone services only if the 
services are obtained by threat, force, or a form of deception not described in 
Sections 76-6-409.5 through 76-6-409.9. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 76-6-409, enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-4-409; 1987, ch. 38, § 1; 
1989, ch. 30, § 1; 1994, ch. 215, § 1. 
NOTES: AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994, added 
Subsection (5). 
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